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From Operational Disruption to Strategic Effect: Achieving Strategic Success in Countering Narcotics and Transnational Organized Crime

RAND · Elina Treyger, Irina A. Chindea, Pauline Moore, Kelly Piazza, Tahina Montoya, Lisa Saum-Manning ·

Executive Summary

This RAND paper analyzes the U.S. Department of War's (DOW) role in counternarcotics (CN) and counter-transnational organized crime (CTOC) missions, focusing on interdiction, counter-threat finance, and security cooperation. It evaluates how these instruments contribute to broader U.S. strategic objectives, highlighting the need for integrated planning and clear definitions of success across public health, law enforcement, and security/stability models. The paper concludes that DOW's capabilities are most effective when synchronized with interagency efforts and assessed against measurable outcomes.

Why It Matters

This document is crucial for defense analysts as it critically assesses the effectiveness of military instruments in countering narcotics and transnational organized crime, offering insights into strategic planning and interagency coordination for national security objectives.

Key Takeaways

  • The U.S. Department of War (DOW) employs interdiction, counter-threat finance (CTF), and security cooperation in counternarcotics (CN) and counter-transnational organized crime (CTOC) missions.
    Source evidence · PDF page 7
    This paper is intended for U.S. Department of War (DOW) leaders, policymakers, and other professionals engaged in or overseeing government counternarcotics (CN) and counter–transnational organized crime (CTOC) missions.2 Its purpose is to help them think about whether and how DOW’s three principal instruments—interdiction, counter-threat finance (CTF), and security cooperation—contribute to broader U.S. government strategic objectives in countering drug-linked organized crime.
  • DOW's CN/CTOC tools are most effective when integrated as a coherent portfolio, synchronized with broader interagency efforts, and assessed against a shared, measurable definition of success.
    Source evidence · PDF page 19
    Each of DOW’s CN/CTOC tools addresses a different obstacle to achieving broader U.S. government strategic objectives—which remain largely nonmilitary in origin. How much value those tools deliver depends on whether they are integrated as a coherent portfolio within DOW, synchronized with broader interagency efforts, and assessed against a shared, measurable definition of success.
  • Strategic success in CN/CTOC can be viewed through three models: public health, law enforcement, and security/stability, each requiring different evidence and expectations for DOW's contributions.
    Source evidence · PDF page 21
    DOW should consider planning its three principal CN/CTOC instruments—interdiction, CTF, and security cooperation—as a coherent portfolio rather than parallel lines of effort. When these instruments are deployed against the same networks, DOW should consider requiring that they be planned jointly around explicit objectives that specify which strategic success model is being pursued and how each instrument is expected to advance it.

Strategic Relevance

This paper provides a critical framework for evaluating the strategic impact of military operations against transnational threats, emphasizing the need for integrated approaches and clear metrics to achieve national security objectives beyond tactical disruptions.

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Key Entities

U.S. Department of War (DOW)RAND CorporationTransnational Organized CrimeCounternarcoticsUnited StatesNational Defense Research InstituteOffice of the Secretary of WarJoint StaffUnified Combatant CommandsU.S. NavyU.S. Marine CorpsDefense Intelligence Enterprise

Best For

Policy MakersDefense StrategistsIntelligence AnalystsMilitary Planners

Related Themes

Transnational CrimeNational Security StrategyInteragency CooperationMilitary OperationsDrug TraffickingSecurity Cooperation