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Winning the Undersea Knife Fight: A Deterrence Framework to Shape Subsea Dilemmas into Competitive Maritime Security Strategies

RAND · Michael Bohnert, Ajay K. Kochhar, Daniel Justice, Paul DeLuca ·

Executive Summary

This report introduces a deterrence framework for the undersea domain, focusing on protecting critical infrastructure like cables and pipelines from sabotage. It highlights the unique challenges of this environment, including low observability, difficult attribution, and the need for tailored strategies. The framework aims to help decision-makers calibrate deterrent postures and address capability gaps.

Why It Matters

This document is crucial for defense and geopolitical analysts as it outlines a strategic framework for deterring attacks on critical undersea infrastructure, a growing area of geopolitical competition and vulnerability for national security and global economies.

Key Takeaways

  • Critical undersea infrastructure, including communication cables and energy pipelines, is highly vulnerable to attack due to its underdefended nature and limited repair capabilities.
    Source evidence · PDF page 2
    Approximately 97 percent of the world’s communication traverses 300 underdefended undersea cables, and new telecom and power cables are activated every year.2 Globally, fewer than 25 cable repair ships are available.
  • Attribution of undersea incidents is a core challenge, often delayed and difficult, which complicates effective response and deterrence strategies.
    Source evidence · PDF page 3
    Fundamentally, this lack of observability and attribution makes the protection of undersea infrastructure difficult and underpins why the undersea knife fight is different from competition in other domains.
  • The undersea domain presents a unique strategic environment characterized by low barriers to entry, high-impact potential, and long timelines for detection and response, necessitating a specialized deterrence framework.
    Source evidence · PDF page 16
    The undersea knife fight represents one of the most consequential and least understood arenas of modern strategic competition. As this report has shown, the combination of low barriers to entry, high-impact potential, long timelines for detection and response, and chronically poor attribution creates a uniquely complex environment in which nations must deter, detect, and respond to hostile actions.

Strategic Relevance

The report addresses a critical vulnerability in global infrastructure, proposing a deterrence framework that integrates attribution, revelation/concealment, and action/reaction to shape adversary behavior in the contested undersea domain. This is vital for national security and economic stability.

Source Website View PDF

Key Entities

National Defense Research InstituteRANDUndersea InfrastructureDeterrenceAttributionUndersea WarfareSubmarine CablesPipelinesUNCLOSInternational Cable Protection Committee

Best For

Policy MakersDefense StrategistsMaritime Security AnalystsIntelligence AnalystsInfrastructure Protection Specialists

Related Themes

Undersea WarfareCritical Infrastructure ProtectionDeterrence TheoryGeopolitical CompetitionMaritime SecurityHybrid Warfare

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