Executive Summary
This paper challenges the prevailing wisdom that offensive advantage in international relations is always detrimental. It proposes a formal model where state welfare is U-shaped under increasing offensive advantage. While high defensive advantage is optimal (peace with low arms spending), high offensive advantage can be better than intermediate levels because wars become quicker and less costly, potentially improving welfare over a costly, high-tension peace.
Why It Matters
This document offers a counter-intuitive perspective on the offense-defense balance, suggesting that high offensive advantage can, under certain conditions, lead to less costly and shorter conflicts, which is crucial for understanding strategic stability and conflict dynamics.
Key Takeaways
- State welfare exhibits a U-shaped relationship with increasing offensive advantage, challenging the linear assumption that more offense is always worse.
- High defensive advantage is optimal, while intermediate offensive advantage is the most detrimental due to high deterrence costs and destructive wars.
- In war equilibria, increasing offensive advantage can improve welfare by making conflicts less total, shorter, and more decisive.
- The model extends Fearon's work by analyzing war equilibria and incorporating endogenous arms choices and war costs.
- Historical examples from various conflicts are used to illustrate the theoretical framework.
Strategic Relevance
This paper redefines the understanding of the offense-defense balance, providing a nuanced framework for analyzing how military technological shifts impact international stability and conflict outcomes. It suggests that policymakers should consider the specific level of offensive advantage when assessing deterrence strategies and potential conflict costs.