Executive Summary
This paper argues that military innovation can be self-defeating when security commitments outstrip shrinking resources, leading services to gamble on new capabilities while cannibalizing traditional ones. It tests this theory by comparing British and German armored warfare innovations before WWII, finding that British over-specialization led to poor performance in the Desert War, while German combined-arms innovation was more effective. The study concludes that innovation's quality and process are crucial, not just its presence.
Why It Matters
This document is crucial for defense analysts as it challenges the conventional wisdom that military innovation always improves effectiveness, highlighting the risks of over-specialization and resource constraints in modernization efforts. It offers a framework for understanding how innovation can be detrimental, particularly relevant for contemporary defense planning.
Key Takeaways
- Military innovation can be self-defeating, especially when growing security commitments outstrip shrinking resources, leading to flawed processes and cannibalization of traditional capabilities.
Source evidence · PDF page 2
My central claim is that innovation is more likely to weaken a military service’s effectiveness when growing security commitments outstrip shrinking resources. This commitment-resource gap creates an atmosphere of professional crisis that animates a flawed innovation process that cannibalizes traditional capabilities before beliefs about the effectiveness of a new one is justified.
- Harmful innovation results in new capabilities failing to deliver promised effects and vulnerabilities from the loss of traditional methods, forcing a return to older ways of war.
Source evidence · PDF page 14
Innovation harms military effectiveness insofar as it prevents fielded combat forces from achieving mission objectives, or from doing so at acceptable levels of cost in lives and equipment. The drivers of ineffectiveness are two-fold. First, combat forces associated with the new capability find that their organization and doctrine fail to deliver the promised decisive effects in combat.
- The British Army's interwar armored innovation, driven by a
Source evidence · PDF page 42
Military innovation is more dangerous than generally acknowledged. There is a risk that innovation destroys more than it creates. Facing a wicked mismatch between ambitious commitments outstripping austere resources, the British army developed armored maneuver and cannibalized traditional capabilities, placing a big bet on a radical vision of future warfare while ignoring plausible vulnerabilities.
Strategic Relevance
This paper provides a critical framework for evaluating military modernization programs, emphasizing the dangers of radical innovation without adequate resources or proper vetting. It underscores the importance of balancing new capabilities with existing ones and maintaining a robust, adaptable force structure, particularly for nations facing commitment-resource gaps.