Executive Summary
Sudan faces widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) food insecurity through January 2027, driven by intense conflict, drone warfare, and poor rainfall. A credible risk of Famine (IPC Phase 5) exists in several areas, particularly if conflict escalates or sieges resume, exacerbating food consumption deficits and acute malnutrition. Humanitarian assistance is severely constrained and underfunded, reaching less than 20% of the population in need.
Why It Matters
This document provides a critical assessment of the severe food insecurity and famine risk in Sudan, directly linking it to ongoing military conflict and drone warfare, which is crucial for understanding the humanitarian impact of the conflict and potential destabilization.
Key Takeaways
- Widespread Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) food insecurity are projected across Sudan through January 2027, driven by conflict and poor harvests.
Source evidence · PDF page 1
Emergency (IPC Phase 4) will remain widespread through the peak of the lean season (August-September) across much of Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan, and Blue Nile driven by conflict, deteriorating economic conditions, rising food and fuel prices, and severe erosion of purchasing capacity. Some populations will face Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) outcomes in Um Baru, Kernoi, and At-Tiné of North Darfur; Dilling, Kadugli of South Kordofan and surrounding rural areas; El-Obeid and surrounding areas of North Kordofan; and among some internally displaced populations (IDPs) in Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan.
- Intensified fighting, including drone warfare by both RSF and SAF, is causing displacement, disrupting livelihoods, and targeting critical infrastructure and humanitarian aid convoys.
Source evidence · PDF page 2
In August 2026, fighting intensified in the main frontline areas in Greater Kordofan (particularly North Kordofan), North and West Darfur, and Blue Nile, causing displacement and disrupting livelihoods. Drone warfare continues to intensify, killing civilians, destroying or damaging public infrastructure, and disrupting trade flows. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s coordinated drone attacks targeted El Obeid, Atbara, Omdurman, and Khartoum, while Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) continued to target RSF strongholds in West Kordofan as well as parts of North Darfur (Kabkabiya, Um Kedadah, Al-Fasher, and Melit).
- Humanitarian access remains volatile, underfunded, and constrained, with significant shortfalls in assistance potentially leaving 1.5 million more people without aid by year-end.
Source evidence · PDF page 5
Humanitarian access will likely remain volatile, underfunded, and constrained by high costs, unstable supply, administrative barriers, conflict, and seasonal deterioration. In the context of current anticipated funding shortfalls, reductions in cash assistance after September and in-kind assistance after October could result in 1.5 million more people losing aid by the end of the year.
Strategic Relevance
The severe food insecurity and risk of famine in Sudan, directly caused by ongoing conflict and military operations, highlight the humanitarian consequences of the civil war and its potential to further destabilize the region. This situation could lead to increased displacement, regional migration pressures, and a prolonged humanitarian crisis, impacting international aid efforts and regional security dynamics.