Executive Summary
This thesis analyzes the operational art of Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery during World War II to identify principles applicable to the operational level of war. It aims to define these principles to guide US Army commanders and staff in planning and executing campaigns. The study compares their differing war-fighting styles, maneuver and attrition, to find commonalities in battlefield decision-making.
Why It Matters
This document is crucial for defense analysts as it delves into the historical operational principles of two pivotal WWII commanders, offering timeless insights into military decision-making and campaign planning that remain relevant for modern doctrine development. It directly informs the evolution of US Army operational art, linking historical lessons to contemporary strategic thought.
Key Takeaways
- The study defines operational principles as less abstract than general principles of war but more independent than specific techniques, guiding campaign conduct.
- Rommel and Montgomery, despite different war-fighting styles (maneuver vs. attrition), exhibited commonalities in their operational decision-making criteria.
- The research aims to provide a foundational body of operational principles for the US Army, enhancing its ability to plan and execute future campaigns.
- The thesis highlights the importance of understanding individual commanders' military thought and prevailing doctrines in identifying operational principles.
Strategic Relevance
This thesis directly contributes to the development of military doctrine by identifying enduring operational principles from historical campaigns. Understanding how commanders like Rommel and Montgomery linked tactics to strategy provides a framework for contemporary military leaders to analyze and adapt their own operational art, crucial for future conflict preparedness and success.